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Abstract
The purpose of this Essay is to discuss the areas in which the World Trade Organization
dispute settlement system may be improved in light of the first five years of experience from the
practitioner point of view, and in particular, practitioners advising business or governments acting
on behalf of domestic businesses. Key reforms relating to implementation and compensation may
not necessarily require an amendment to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, since they could be answered by changes in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Essay is to discuss the areas in which the
World Trade Organization 1 ("WTO") dispute settlement system
may be improved in light of the first five years of experience
from the practitioner point of view, and in particular, practition-
ers advising business or governments acting on behalf of domes-
tic businesses. Key reforms relating to implementation and com-
pensation may not necessarily require an amendment to the Un-
derstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes2 ("DSU"), since they could be answered by changes
in practice.
The new WTO dispute settlement system was intended to
strengthen the legitimacy of the substantive rights created by the
WTO Agreements,' so that producers of goods, exporters and
importers, and service suppliers could conduct their business
around the globe and enjoy the benefits of world trade. The
ultimate goal of the WTO is to enable free trade to flow in an
undistorted and competitive market with the value chain from
supplier to consumer as the beneficiary. The WTO dispute pro-
cedure, therefore, provides increased opportunities for lawyers
and other professionals to advise the international business com-
munity as to the existence of its legal rights and the dispute pro-
cedure available to the governments responsible for their com-
mercial interests. It follows that these practitioners will be con-
* Solicitor-Advocate, Ashurst Morris Crisp©, Brussels & London. I would like to
thank Mattia Melloni and Gil Even-Shoshan for their invaluable contribution to this
Essay.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
2. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
3. The World Trade Organization ("WTO") Agreements covered by the Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") con-
sist of all multilateral agreements listed in the WTO Agreement Annex 1 and 2, and all
plurilateral agreements listed in the WTO Agreement Annex 4.
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cerned about the effectiveness of the WTO and its dispute
settlement mechanism for businesses to ensure that their clients'
interests are sufficiently protected.
Although the direct participants in trade disputes are WTO
Members, the majority of governments are becoming involved so
as to ensure that their corporate citizens fully enjoy the benefits
provided by trade liberalisation agreements. It is clear that be-
hind every complaining government stands a large company, or
group of smaller companies, representing an industry. These
companies lobby their government to initiate the procedure and
provide evidence to establish a breach of a WTO covered agree-
ment on the basis, for example, of market access, denial discrim-
ination, or other protectionist measures.
At the moment the number of disputes before WTO author-
ities has surpassed 200, which is a sign of confidence in the sys-
tem. Conversely, it also demonstrates the level of non-compli-
ance and,' indirectly, the barriers to trade encountered by busi-
nesses. As far as businesses are concerned, however, the
ultimate goal of the dispute settlement system is to expeditiously
implement the recommendation of the Panel or Appellate Body.
Not surprisingly, one of the major areas of criticism of the DSU
concerns the provisions pertaining to implementation and com-
pensation. The dispute concerning the U.S. Foreign Sales Cor-
poration ("FSC") tax system for U.S. exporters is a recent illus-
tration.
I. THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Almost all business sectors have been the subject of dispute
proceedings during the first five years of the DSU's operation.
Disputes cover such products as alcohol, brooms, buses, cars, ce-
ment, coconut, coffee, computers, footwear, gasoline, leather,
macaroni, rice, scallops, steel, tobacco, tomatoes, and under-
wear,' in addition to aircraft, computers, and telecommunica-
tions equipment. Services are still under-represented, as there
have been only ten cases out of more than 200. 5
4. Press Release, WTO No. 180 (June 5, 2000).
5. Examples where General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") provisions
were invoked include European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sales and Distribu-
tion of Bananas, WT/DS27; United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act,
WT/DS38; Japan-Measures Affecting Distribution Services, Request for Consultations by
the United States, WT/DS45/1 (June 20, 1996); Belgium-Measures Affecting Commercial
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A. Consultation Stage
Faced with a trade barrier of a legislative nature, the af-
fected business will seek to enlist its government to assist. In the
event that the measure in question is believed to be incompati-
ble with any of the WTO agreements, the government can be
persuaded to initiate the WTO dispute settlement procedure by
requesting formal consultations. In many cases this would be
sufficient for the other WTO Members to take action to remove
the trade barrier.6
A typical WTO consultation meeting lasts no more than two
or three hours in a tiny room of the WTO building in Geneva,
during which governments and their legal counsel discuss the
issue carefully.7 At this stage of the procedure, the business com-
munity is not officially represented by its legal counsel of choice,
but by the government and its legal staff.
It is unclear whether business interests are well served by
consultation. In a scenario where the European Communities
forbid exports of a specific product, the only complainant could
be the government of the Member whose importers are being
frustrated. That government, however, might not consider that
the interests of its importers deserve protection. The govern-
ment may have a pending and more important case to solve with
the European Communities, and probably the most convenient
thing for it is to use the dispute as part of a trade-off. This leads
to unlawful practices that are in conflict with business interests.
Some WTO Members, however, allow their business com-
munity to voice concerns any time business interests are at stake
in other markets.
Telephony Directory Services, Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS80/
1S/L/36 (May 13, 1997); Canada-Measures Affecting Film Distribution Services, Request
for Consultations by the European Communities, WT/DS117/1S/L/53 (Jan. 22, 1998);
Nicaragua-Measures Affecting Imports from Honduras and Columbia, WT/DS201; and Mex-
ico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services WT/DS204.
6. Consultations must be held within 60 days after the receipt of the request from
the requested Member. If the requested Member does not enter into consultations
within that period, the complainant may proceed to request the establishment of a
Panel. See DSU art. 4.3.
7. William J. Davey & Amelia Porges, Performance of the System I: Consultations &
Deterrence, 32 INT'L. LAw. 695-707 (1998).
THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
B. European Communities Example: The Trade Barriers Regulation
(or "TBR")
The trade-off scenario described above may be avoided in
legal orders where a legally enforceable procedure has been cre-
ated for the business community to complain against unfair
trade practices, such as in the EU and the United States. Section
301 of the Trade Act of 19748 provides explicit procedures
under which U.S. citizens could petition the U.S. government
for action against harmful foreign government activities.9
In the EU, in addition to lobbying their government and/or
the European Commission (informally), businesses can request
the European Commission, to take action to remove obstacles to
trade1 ° under the so-called "Trade Barriers Regulation."1 " These
obstacles include practices violating the WTO rules, as well as
practices that do not infringe WTO rules but nevertheless nullify
or impair the benefits that are expected to arise from the trade
agreements. If the Commission's investigation under the TBR
confirms the complaining business's claims and there are no
prevailing interests against such action, the Commission may ini-
tiate a WTO dispute settlement procedure to remove the obsta-
cle to trade. The settlement procedure attempts to remove the
obstacle to trade through consultations and eventually the estab-
lishment of a Panel to find that the contested practice consti-
tutes an infringement by the third country of the WTO rules and
to recommend that it be removed.
During the whole TBR proceeding, the complainant, the
exporters and importers involved, as well as representatives of
the countries concerned may have access to all information
8. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2419 (1994).
9. The Act was amended in 1979, 1984, and 1988. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL.,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CASES, MATERIAL AND TEXT
815-17 (1995).
10. For a comparative analysis of § 301 with the Trade Barriers Regulation
("TBR"), see Petros C. Mavroidis & Werner Zdouc, Legal Means to Protect Private Parties'
Interests in the WFO: The Case of the EC New Trade Barriers Regulation, J. INT'L. ECON. L.
407, 407-32 (1998).
11. Council Regulation No. 3286/94, O.J.L. 349/71 (1994), laying down Commu-
nity procedures in the field of common commercial policy in order to ensure the exer-
cise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular those es-
tablished under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. This regulation was
amended by Council Regulation No. 356/95, OJ.L. 41/3 (1995).
2000]
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made available to the European Commission.1 2 If successful, a
TBR procedure, may achieve the early termination of the trade
barriers in issue.
The first TBR case resulting in a Panel ruling was the EU
complaint regarding the U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 191613
("1916 Act"). The complaint in that case was submitted by the
European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries
("EUROFER") as a result of several lawsuits under the 1916 Anti-
Dumping Act brought by the U.S. steel industry against imports
from the EU. The 1916 Act is different from the anti-dumping
provisions in the U.S. Tariff Act, as it entitles Federal Courts to
impose treble damages and criminal penalties on persons found
to have imported goods into the United States at dumped prices.
This act has been invoked several times against EU companies
over the last few years, thereby affecting EU exports to the
United States. The TBR investigation concluded that the 1916
Act was in breach of the anti-dumping rules of the WTO. Hav-
ing failed to resolve the matter amicably, the EU requested WTO
consultations with the United States on June 4, 1998. Following
unsuccessful consultations on July 29, 1998, the EU requested a
Panel on November 11, 1998. The Panel, which was established
on February 1, 1999, issued its final report to the parties on Feb-
ruary 15, 2000, and circulated it to all the WTO Members on
March 31, 2000.14 The Panel ruled that the 1916 Act covers anti-
dumping practices but without fulfilling the basic conditions
under which dumping measures are permitted under the WTO
rules, in particular, (i) by not requiring the establishment of a
material injury, (ii) by going beyond the permitted remedy
against dumping (i.e., anti-dumping duties), and (iii) by not
complying with the procedural requirements regarding anti-
dumping investigations (e.g., that a complaint shall be sup-
ported by a minimum proportion of the industry). The United
States, therefore, was asked to bring its regime into compliance
with its WTO obligations. The Panel report was appealed and
on August 28, 2000, the Appellate Body issued its final report
upholding the Panel's findings.15
12. Council Regulation No. 3286/94, art. 8, O.J.L. 349/71 (1994).
13. Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
14. United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Complaint by the European Communi-
ties, WT/DS136/R (Mar. 31, 2000).
15. Id.
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The second TBR case resulting in a Panel ruling was the
recent EU complaint regarding Argentina's export regime on
raw hides and Argentina's import regime of finished leathers.
The TBR investigation was initiated on February 26, 1997 (the
complaint was submitted by the Confederation of EC Tanners
and Dressers ("COTANCE")) and presented to the EU Member
States in December of 1997. The investigation concluded that
the Argentinean export regime on raw hides and the import re-
gime of finished leather were contrary to General Agreement on
.Tariffs and Trade 199416 ("GATT 1994") rules, in particular Arti-
cles XI, X:3, and 111:2. Bilateral discussions between the two
countries were initiated after the TBR findings, but they did not
lead to an amicable solution. On December 23, 1998, the EU
requested WTO consultations with Argentina. These consulta-
tions failed to lead to a satisfactory solution and, therefore, the
EU requested the establishment of a Panel on May 31, 1999. A
Panel was established on June 26, 1999, and its final report was
circulated to all WTO Members on December 19, 2000.17 The
.Panel found that Argentina's export regime for raw hides vio-
lated Argentina's obligations under GATT Article X:3. In partic-
ular, Argentina failed to administer its customs laws in a manner
that is "uniform, impartial and reasonable." At the same time
the Panel rejected the EU's complaint regarding the legitimacy
of Argentina's export regime on raw hides with GATT 1994 Arti-
cle XI. In particular the Panel found that the EU had not been
able to prove that there was an export restriction made effective
by the Argentinean measure within the meaning of Article XI.
The Panel, however, found that Argentina's import regime of
finished leather was contrary to GATT 1994 Article 111:2 because
the tax treatment reserved to European finished leather prod-
ucts exceeded that imposed on Argentinean finished leather
products. Argentina, therefore, was asked to bring its regimes
into compliance with its WTO obligations.
Other important cases that started as a TBR investigation
and ended in Geneva are Japan-Tariff Quotas and Subsidies Af
16. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, W'TO Agree-
ment, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33
I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
17. Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export Bovine Hides and Import of Finished
Leather, Report of the Panel, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000).
.2000]
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fecting Leather8 regarding the Japanese system of tariff quotas for
leather (the complaint was again submitted by COTANCE), and
more recently, Chile-Measures Affecting the Transit and Importa-
tion of Swordfish 9 ("Chile-Transhipment of Swordfish") (com-
plaint by the Spanish National Association of owners of Deep-Sea
longliners ("ANAPA")).
In Japan-Tariff Quotas and Subsidies Affecting Leather, the
TBR investigation concluded that the tariff quota management
for leather was in violation of the WTO Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures2° and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures2' ("SMS Agreement"). In particular,
the European Commission found that Japan was granting subsi-
dies to its domestic leather industry within the meaning of Arti-
cle 1 of the SCM Agreement, causing serious injury to the EC
leather industry. The subsidy was also granted to a "specific" in-
dustry, namely the leather industry, in violation of Article 2 of
the SCM Agreement.
In Chile-Transhipment of Swordfish, the Chilean authorities
prohibited the transit and transhipment of swordfish catches in
Chilean ports without a specific zoo-sanitary certificate. The Eu-
ropean Commission contended that the requirement of a zoo-
sanitary certificate was inconsistent with Article 2 of the Agree-
ment on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Mea-
sures22 ("SPS") since the measure was not the sole remedy availa-
ble to the Chilean authorities to conserve swordfish resources in
the South Pacific area. The European Commission also claimed
inconsistency with Article V of GATT 1994 that could not be jus-
tified under GATT Article XX(b).
Japan-Tariff Quotas and Subsidies Affecting Leather is still
pending at the consultation stage of WTO dispute settlement
proceedings, whereas for Chile-Transhipment of Swordfish, the
18. Japan-Tariff Quotas and Subsidies Affecting Leather, Request for Consultations by
the European Communities, WT/DS147 (Oct. 14, 1998).
19. Chile-Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, WT/DS193
(Nov. 7, 2000).
20. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/finale.htm.
21. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/finale.htm.
22. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/le-
gal-e/finale.htm.
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European Commission recently requested the establishment of a
panel. However, on January 25, 2000 the European Commission
and Chile have found an amicable solution. As a result, the EU,
on behalf of its Member States, will request a suspension of the
panel proceedings.
C. The Panel and Appellate Body Stage
If formal consultations within the WTO fail, the govern-
ment may be persuaded to request the establishment of a Panel,
whose recommendation, if adopted by the Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB"), is binding on WTO Members.
Throughout Panel and Appellate Body proceedings, the
business interested in the success of the dispute, since the
WTO's Appellate Body ruling in United States-Import Prohibition
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products2" ("Shrimps"), may be able to
provide the relevant Panel with an amicus curiae brief containing
its view and evidence to support it.
In Shrimps, the United States attached to its submission
three amicus curiae briefs prepared by non-governmental organi-
zations ("NGOs"), and the Appellate Body found that a party has
a right to attach whatever it wishes to its submissions, but when it
does, it is responsible for the contents of that submission.
In United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the
United Kingdom, 4 as a preliminary procedural issue, the Appel-
late Body ruled that it had the authority to accept and consider
amicus curiae briefs in an appeal where it finds it "pertinent and
useful to do so." In that case, two U.S. steel industry associations
submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Appellate Body in support
of the position of the appellant, the United States. The EC ob-
jected to the filing of these briefs, arguing that the Appellate
Body did not have legal authority under the DSU to accept and
consider such briefs. The Appellate Body found that it did have
legal authority, but also found that it was not necessary, in that
23. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of
the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
24. United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Request of the Establish-
ment of a Panel by the European Communities, WT/DS138/3 Uan. 14, 1999).
2000]
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case, to take the two briefs filed into account when rendering its
decision.
In European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and As-
bestos-Containing Products25 ("Asbestos"), the Panel considered that
two amicus curiae briefs included in the submission of the Euro-
pean Communities were relevant for the purpose of the case, but
it dismissed three others that were not relevant. Asbestos was ap-
pealed on October 23, 2000. In its proceeding, the Appellate
Body recently confirmed the right of any person, other than dis-
puting or third party Members, to submit written briefs to WTO
authorities. 26
In the recent case regarding imports into EC of Cotton-Type
Bed Linen from India, 7 the Panel received an unsolicited amicus
curiae brief that was made promptly available to the parties to the
dispute, though none of the parties subsequently made com-
ments. The Panel, therefore, did not take it into account.
D. The Implementation Stage.
If the Panel or Appellate Body report contains a recommen-
dation that the measure in question be withdrawn, the affected
WTO Member must, within a month from the date of adoption
of the report by the DSB,2 8 inform the DSB of its intentions in
respect of implementation. If immediate compliance is imprac-
ticable, a "reasonable period of time" will be determined either
(i) by the Member concerned and approved by the DSB, (ii) by
the Parties to the dispute within forty-five days, or (iii) by an arbi-
trator within ninety days from the adoption of the recommenda-
tions by the DSB. The arbitrator must take into account the
guideline that a "reasonable period of time" should not exceed
fifteen months from the date of adoption of a Panel or Appellate
Body report.29
In case of disagreement as to whether the implementing
measures taken are consistent with the covered agreement, the
25. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Prod-
ucts, Report of the Panel, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
26. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Prod-
ucts, Communication from the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/9 (Nov. 8, 2000).
27. European Communities-Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen
from India, Report of the Panel, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000).
28. DSU art. 21(3).
29. DSU art. 21(3)(c).
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matter will be referred to the original Panel, which must circu-
late its report within ninety days after the date of referral.3"
Business input at this stage is very important, as only the
companies trading with the WTO Member in question are in a
position to assess whether the obstacles to trade have been effec-
tively removed. WTO rules provide that the surveillance of the
implementation of the recommendations or rulings must be in-
cluded on the agenda of the DSB meeting six months after the
date on which the "reasonable period of time" was established
and must remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved.
At least ten days prior to each DSB meeting, the Member con-
cerned has to provide the DSB with a written status report
describing its progress in the implementation of the recommen-
dations or rulings. As the issue of implementation may be raised
at the DSB by any Member at any time,3' businesses belonging
either to the Member that brought the original complaint, or
any other Member, can alert their government and provide it
with accurate status reports so that the implementation of the
Panel or Appellate Body's recommendations will be given full
attention. On the other hand, businesses operating in the terri-
tory of the condemned WTO Member would be well advised to
monitor the rulings and implementation procedures in case they
can assist that Member to defend its industry from retaliatory
measures.
If the condemned measures are not removed within the
"reasonable period of time," mutually acceptable compensation
or the suspension of concessions or other obligations (retaliatory
measures) 32 could be considered within twenty days from the ex-
piry of the "reasonable period of time," subject to DSB authori-
zation.3 Unlike in the case of implementation (i.e., the removal
of the obstacle to trade), compensation or retaliatory measures
as a temporary solution to the dispute might be less interesting
30. DSU art. 21(5). If the Panel requires further time, it should inform the DSB in
writing of the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit
its report.
31. DSU art. 21(6); see also European Communities-Measures Affecting Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26 and WT/DS48; European Communities-Regime for the Im-
portation, Sales and Distribution of Bananas, Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS27/
ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
32. DSU art. 22(1).
33. DSU art. 22(2).
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for the affected businesses. Compensation may be in relation to
goods or services that, albeit in the same or related trade sector,
are of no benefit to them. Retaliation would benefit businesses
only indirectly as a means of pressuring the offending Member
government to implement the ruling and remove the contested
measure.
Retaliatory measures are directed primarily at concessions
or other obligations applicable to the same sector as that in
which the Panel or Appellate Body found an infringement or if
not practicable or effective, other sectors under the same WTO
agreement or under another agreement. 4 DSB authorization
for retaliatory measures will be granted within thirty days from
the expiration of the "reasonable period of time" unless arbitra-
tion by the original Panel is requested in respect of the level of
suspension proposed. 5
The arbitrator may only examine whether the level of the
retaliatory measures is equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment caused by the condemned measure and whether
such measures are permitted under the covered agreement.
The DSB will grant authorization to retaliate in accordance with
the arbitrator's decision unless there is a consensus against it.
3 6
This procedure was applied for the first time in the European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sales and Distribution of
Bananas7 ("Banana Dispute"), where the arbitrator reduced the
level of suspension sought by the United States against the EU
from US$520,000,000 to US$191,400,000. This level was deter-
mined by the arbitrators to be the level of nullification suffered
by the United States and was approved by the DSB. Similarly, in
European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Prod-
ucts (Hormones), 8 the EU offered compensation in view of the
likelihood that it would not be able to comply with the recom-
mendations and rulings of the DSB by the deadline. Canada
and the United States, however, requested authorization for the
suspension of concessions in the amount of US$202,000,000 and
34. DSU art. 22(3)(a)-(c).
35. DSU art. 22(6).
36. DSU art. 22(7).
37. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sales and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
38. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26.
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CAN$75,000,000, respectively. At the EU's request, the level of
suspension was referred to the original Panel for arbitration.
The arbitrators determined the level of nullification suffered by
the United States to be equal to US$116,800,000 and that of Ca-
nada to be equal to CAN$11,300,000.39
As mentioned above, retaliation is a means of exercising
pressure on the offending government to implement the Panel
or Appellate Body ruling and, in this sense, is indirectly benefi-
cial to businesses. It would appear, however, that if the offend-
ing measures are considered very important to the WTO Mem-
ber in question, as the banana regime appears to be for the EC,
the effect of retaliation might be reduced. In this connection,
there are two further issues that have to be considered, the size
and the strength of the WTO Member against which retaliation
measures are taken. (It would appear more likely that a small or
developing country would rather give up the offending measure
than face retaliation.)
It is noteworthy that a small developing country like Ecua-
dor was allowed by the Panel in the Banana Dispute to cross-retal-
iate against the EC under the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property4' ("TRIPS") pursuant to Article 22
of the DSU.4 1 Ecuador, in particular targeted wine and spirit
products in the context of Article 23 of TRIPS (geographical in-
dications) since wine and spirits represent a sensitive area of ex-
ports for European industry. The sanctions are not in place yet,
but the EC seems to be under great pressure to comply with its
WTO obligations.42
39. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hornones),
Original Complaint by the United States, Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the Arbitrators, VT/DS26/
ARB (July 12, 1999); European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Original Complaint by Canada, Recourse to Arbitration by the European
Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS48/
ARB (July 12, 1999).
40. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
41. Cross-retaliation has to be justified by the country that imposes sanctions by
showing the severity of the damage suffered in economic and commercial terms. See
DSU art. 22(3) (d).
42. Cristian Espinosa, A Developing Country Perspective of WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, Paper presented at the World Trade Law Association, London (Nov.
2000).
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The targeted industries of the WTO Member are those
whose exports are subject to retaliation measures. Normally, re-
taliation occurs in respect of the same sector that is deemed to
benefit from the offending measures and the retaliation would
be effective if that industry engages in export activity to the com-
plaining Member. If, however, retaliation is allowed (by the arbi-
trator) to target a different export industry, that could lead to
internal pressure on the offending WTO Member to implement
the Panel or Appellate Body recommendations and comply with
the WTO rules.
The dispute between Ecuador and the EU over bananas
could be a good reason for European manufacturers of wine and
spirits to lobby the EC institutions to bring the regime for ba-
nanas into compliance with the EC obligations under the WTO.
II. WIN SOME-LOSE SOME: NOT WIN-WIN
The majority of WTO disputes do not reach the Panel
stage." Some are settled either as a result of an assessment by
the parties of the merits of the case or for practical reasons.
Some reach the Panel stage and once the Panel is established,
the disputes remain pending until the Panel's authority lapses.
The majority of disputes in which a Panel report has been is-
sued, however, have also been appealed." In addition, imple-
mentation is often prolonged.
The examples set out below illustrate that sometimes the es-
tablishment of a Panel may be an incentive to bring the dispute
to an end, but in other cases even an Appellate Body report con-
demning the WTO Member concerned may not achieve the pur-
pose of removing the contested measure. The following exam-
ples illustrate three possible results of the initiation of a WIG
dispute settlement. The first is no result as the FSC dispute illus-
trates."5 The second example is successful implementation fol-
43. According to Professor Hudec only fifty per cent of the cases proceed to the
establishment of a panel. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WIFO Dispute Settlement Proce-
dures: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 1-49 (1999).
44. 31 Appellate Body Reports have been issued from January 1, 1995, to Septem-
ber 18, 2000. Dispute Settlement Body-Annual Report (2000), Addendum, Overview of the
State of Play of WTO Disputes, WT/DSB/21/Add.1 (Nov. 27, 2000).
45. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sales, and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, WT/DS27; European Communities-Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), WT/DS 26 and WT/DS48. The Bananas and Hormones disputes have not
achieved meaningful results over implementation as well. In Bananas, retaliatory mea-
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lowing the full procedure, as India-Patent Protection for Pharma-
ceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products46 and Canada-Certain
Measures Concerning Periodicals4" illustrate. The third example is
removal of the contested obstacle to trade without completing
all stages of the procedure, as the European Communities-Mea-
sures Affecting Butter Productss and United States-Imposition of
Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Colour Television Receivers from Ko-
rea49 disputes illustrate.
A. U.S. Foreign Sales Corporations50
The FSC scheme provided for by Sections 921-927 of the
U.S. Internal Revenue Code51 and related measures establishes a
special tax treatment for FSCs. This scheme exempts U.S. com-
panies from taxes that would otherwise have to be paid on their
export sales. The Appellate Body upheld the EU's claim that
this scheme constituted an export subsidy giving U. S. compa-
nies an unfair advantage and creating major distortions of inter-
national trade, which cost the United States around
US$3,500,000,000 each year.52
An FSC is a shell company of a U.S. corporation established
in a tax haven (more then ninety percent are in the Virgin Is-
lands, Barbados, and Guam) whose aim is to serve as a vehicle of
U.S. exports, and in this way, reduce the due tax by fifteen per-
cent to thirty percent.
sures are in place almost five years after the dispute started, whereas in Hormones, retali-
atory measures are in place four years after the dispute started.
46. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS50 (implementing the Panel's recommendations two years after the dispute
started).
47. Canada-Ceitain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31 (implementing the
Appellate Body and Panel's recommendations two years and seven months after the
dispute started).
48. European Communities-Measures Affecting Butter Products, Request for the Estab-
lishment of a Panel by New Zealand, WT/DS72/2 (July 11, 1997) (establishing a Panel
that has facilitated the termination of the dispute through a mutually agreed-upon solu-
tion two years and eight months after the dispute started).
49. United States-Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Colour Television Re-
ceivers from Korea, Request for Consultations by Korea, WT/DS89/1 (July 16, 1997) (il-
lustrating that the United States withdrew the contested measure following the estab-
lishment of a Panel). The dispute lasted one year and two months. Id.
50. United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," Request for
Consultations by the European Communities, WT/DS108/1 (Nov. 28, 1997).
51. I.R.C. §§ 921-27 (1994).
52. See id.
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This dispute was initiated by an EU complaint dated Novem-
ber 18, 1997, alleging that the FSC scheme was inconsistent with
U.S. obligations under Articles 111:4 and XVI of the GATT 1994,
Articles 3.1 (a) and (b) of the SCM Agreement,53 and Articles 3
and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture.54 On July 1, 1998, the
EU requested the establishment of a Panel. In its request for a
Panel, the EU invoked Article 3.1 (a) and (b) of the SCM Agree-
ment and Articles 3, 8, 9, and 10 of the Agreement on Agricul-
ture, but did not pursue the claims under the GATT 1994. At its
meeting on September 22, 1998, the DSB established a Panel.
Barbados, Canada, and Japan reserved their rights as third-par-
ties to the dispute.
The Panel found that, through the FSC scheme, the United
States acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article
3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement, as well as with its obligations
under Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture (and conse-
quently with its obligations under Article 8 of that Agreement).
The report of the Panel was circulated to Members on October
8, 1999."5 On November 26, 1999, the United States announced
its intention to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpreta-
tions developed by the Panel.
The Appellate Body circulated its report to Members on
February 24, 2000. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's find-
ing that the FSC measure constituted a prohibited subsidy under
Article 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body, how-
ever, reversed the Panel's finding that the FSC measure involved
"the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing ex-
ports" of agricultural products under Article 9.1(d) of the Agri-
culture Agreement, and in consequence, reversed the Panel's
findings that the United States had acted inconsistently with its
obligations under Article 3.3 of the Agriculture Agreement. The
Appellate Body further found that the United States acted incon-
sistently with its obligations under Articles 10.1 and 8 of the Agri-
culture Agreement by applying export subsidies, through the
FSC measure, in a manner which results in, or threatens to lead
to, circumvention of its export subsidy commitments with re-
53. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 3.1.
54. Agreement on Agriculture art. 3, 8, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final_e.htm.
55. Id.
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spect to agricultural products. The Appellate Body also em-
phasised that it was not ruling that a Member must choose one
kind of tax system to be consistent with that Member's WTO ob-
ligations.
The DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the Panel
report, as modified by the Appellate Body report, at its meeting
on March 20, 2000.56 Pursuant to Article 21.3 of the DSU, the
United States informed the DSB on April 7, 2000, of its intention
to implement the recommendations of the DSB in a manner
consistent with its WTO obligations.
On May 2, 2000, the United States presented to the EU a
replacement regime for FSC to bring U.S. legislation in line with
its WTO obligations within the deadline established by the
WTO. The EU apparently felt that the new regime would not be
enough to comply with the DSB ruling.
On September 30, 2000, the United States and EU agreed
on the establishment of a new panel to review the FSC replace-
ment legislation once adopted. 57 The EU asked the WTO to au-
thorize retaliatory sanctions in case the revisited version of the
FSC was in violation of U.S. obligations under WTO rules. This
Panel would report before sanctions could be imposed by the
EU.
B. Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products in India58
A complaint was made by the European Communities on
April 28, 1997, with respect to the alleged absence in India of
patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
products and the absence of formal systems that permit the fil-
ing of patent applications and provide exclusive marketing
rights for such products. The EC claimed that this was inconsis-
tent with India's obligations under Article 70, paragraphs eight
and nine, of the TRIPS Agreement. 59 On September 9, 1997,
56. Id.
57. See The European Commission Website, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/
trade/index/en.htm.
58. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, WT/DS79/1 (May 6, 1997).
59. See a similar United States complaint in India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuti-
cal and Agricultural Chemical Products, Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, Action
by the Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DS50/9 (Jan. 27, 1998) (adopting the Panel and
Appellate Body reports on January 16, 1998).
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the EC requested the establishment of a Panel. At its meeting
on October 16, 1997, the DSB established a Panel. The United
States reserved its third-party rights. The Panel found that India
had not complied with its obligations under Article 70.8(a) of
the TRIPS Agreement by failing to establish a legal basis that
adequately preserves novelty and priority in respect to applica-
tions for product patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical inventions. India also was not in compliance with Arti-
cle 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement by failing to establish a system
for the grant of exclusive marketing rights. The report of the
Panel was circulated to Members on August 24, 1998.
At its meeting on September 2, 1998, the DSB adopted the
Panel Report. India indicated at the DSB meeting of October
21, 1998, that it needed a reasonable period of time to comply
with the DSB recommendations and that it intended to have bi-
lateral consultations with the EC to agree on a mutually accept-
able period of time. At the DSB meeting on November 25, 1998,
India read out a joint statement done with the EC, in which it
was agreed that the implementation period in this dispute would
correspond to the implementation period in a similar dispute
brought by the United States.60 At the DSB meeting on April 28,
1999, India presented its final status report on implementation
of India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chem-
ical Products. The report also applies to implementation in this
dispute. The report disclosed the enactment of the relevant leg-
islation to implement the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB.
C. Canadian Periodicals
61
A complaint by the United States dated March 11, 1996, al-
leged that measures prohibiting or restricting the importation
into Canada of certain periodicals are in contravention of GATT
1994 Article XI. The United States further alleged that the tax
treatment of so-called "split-run" periodicals and the application
of favourable postage rates to certain Canadian periodicals are
inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article III. The DSB established a
panel on June 19, 1996. The Panel found the measures applied
60. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
lW1/DS1O.
61. Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT'/DS31.
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by Canada to be in violation of GATT 1994 rules. The report of
the Panel was circulated to Members on March 14, 1997. On
April 29, 1997, Canada notified its intention to appeal certain
issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's findings and conclusions
on the applicability of GATT 1994 to Part V.1 of Canada's Excise
Tax Act6 2 ("Excise Act"), but reversed the Panel's finding that
Part V.1 of the Excise Act is inconsistent with the first sentence
of Article 111:2 of GATT 1994. The Appellate Body further con-
cluded that Part V.1 of the Excise Act is inconsistent with the
second sentence of Article 111:2 of GATT 1994. The Appellate
Body also reversed the Panel's conclusion that Canada's
"funded" postal rate scheme is justified by Article 111:8(b) of
GATT 1994. The report of the Appellate Body was circulated to
Members on June 30, 1997. At its meeting on July 30, 1997, the
DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the Panel report, as
modified by the Appellate Body. The implementation period
was agreed by the parties to be fifteen months from the date of
adoption of the reports (i.e., it expired on October 30, 1998).
Canada has withdrawn the contested measure.
D. New Zealand Butter Products63
A complaint by New Zealand dated March 24, 1997, alleged
that the decisions by the EC and the United Kingdom's Customs
and Excise Department to the effect that New Zealand butter
manufactured by the ANMIX butter-making process and the
spreadable butter-making process be classified so as to be ex-
cluded from eligibility for New Zealand's country-specific tariff
quota established by the EC's WTO Schedule are in violations of
Articles II, X, and XI of GATT 1994, Article 2 of the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade64 ("TBT Agreement"), and Arti-
cle 3 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.65 On
November 6, 1997, New Zealand requested the establishment of
a panel. The DSB established a panel on November 18, 1997.
The United States reserved its third-party rights. At the request
of the complainants, dated February 24, 1999, the Panel agreed,
62. Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985.
63. European Communities-Measures Affecting Butter Products, WT/DS72.
64. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WATO Agreement,
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/final_e.htm.
65. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures art. 3.
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pursuant to Article 12.12 of the DSU, to suspend the Panel pro-
ceedings. In a communication dated November 11, 1999, the
parties notified the DSB that a mutually agreed solution to this
dispute had been reached.
E. U.S. Anti-Dumping Duties on SamsungB6
A complaint by Korea dated July 10, 1997, concerned the
imposition of anti-dumping duties by the United States on im-
ports of color television receivers ("CTVs") from Korea. Korea
claimed that the United States has for the past twelve years main-
tained an anti-dumping order for Samsung's CTVs despite the
absence of dumping and the cessation of exports from Korea,
without examining the necessity of continuing to impose such
duties. The United States action was therefore in violation of
Articles VI.1 and VI.6(a) of GATT 1994, and Articles 1, 2, 3.1,
3.2, 3.6, 4.1, 5.4, 5.8, 5.10, 11.1, and 11.2 of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade6 7 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement"). On November 6,
1997, Korea requested the establishment of a Panel. On January
5, 1998, Korea informed the DSB that it was withdrawing its re-
quest for a Panel but reserving its right to reintroduce the re-
quest. At the DSB meeting on September 22, 1998, Korea an-
nounced that it was definitively withdrawing the request for a
Panel because the imposition of anti-dumping duties had now
been revoked.
III. IS THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM WORKING?
The major area of criticism of the WTO dispute settlement
system concerns the provisions dealing with implementation and
compensation as discussed above. The majority of the disputes,
from the establishment of a Panel to the withdrawal of the WTO
inconsistent measure, last from two to three years. Thereafter,
long implementation periods follow and sometimes the disputes
do not appear to be resolved many years after the matter has
been decided on appeal. This issue is of major concern for busi-
66. United States-Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Colour Television
Receivers from Korea, Request for Consultations by Korea, WT/DS89/1 (July 16, 1997).
67. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal_e/final_e.htm.
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nesses as it causes irreparable damage.6"
Implementation is ineffective because the process takes too
long and the remedies available to the aggrieved Member are
limited. The problem of duration can be attributed to two types
of factors: those inherent in the dispute system itself, such as the
general language of Panel and Appellate Body recommenda-
tions and the long period of time set by the DSU or granted by
the arbitrator, and those factors caused deliberately by the losing
party to the dispute. The two are inter-related, as delaying tac-
tics have been made possible by the DSU. Remedies, such as
retaliation, are available to a limited extent and at such a late
stage that they risk being ineffective.
The Panel and Appellate Body recommendations do not
contain useful information pertaining to implementation apart
from the general requirement of "bringing the measure into
compliance." Instead, the Panels seek to avoid making their rul-
ings any more intrusive than necessary and therefore do not
make any suggestion as what kind of action would bring the con-
tested measure into compliance.69
WTO Members are required to "promptly" comply with
Panel and Appellate Body rulings and recommendations.
Prompt compliance, however, seldom happens, and members
often resort to arbitration to determine what is the reasonable
time for implementation. Often, almost as a rule, the maximum
fifteen month period will be granted, thereby prolonging the
disputes, sometimes, arguably, unnecessarily.7" The VWTO case
concerning the sale and distribution of bananas in the EC is an
example of a procedure now entering its sixth year.
The surveillance mechanism is not sufficient to guarantee
full implementation of Panel and Appellate Body rulings since
there are no specific rules requiring the losing Member to re-
port on the action taken to eliminate the inconsistent WTO mea-
sure. As a result, there have been cases where no implementa-
68. Constance Kann, Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement System-A Sneak Preview?, 4
INtr'L. TRADE & REG. 151-55 (1998).
69. Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 4 (2000).
70. Only in a few cases did arbitrators opt for a shorter period of time, namely
eight and 12 months. See Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, WT/
DS18; Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54, WT/DS55,
WT/DS59, and WT/DS64.
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tion has been made at all. 7 '
The remedies available under the DSU are limited to retali-
ation and compensation. Retaliation, although potentially bene-
ficial for business as a means of exercising pressure on the of-
fending Member to implement the Panel and the Appellate
Body rulings, does not facilitate market access.
Monetary compensation to be paid to injured WTO Mem-
bers may be considered an alternative provided that it grants
some relief to the affected business. This remedy, however, does
not seem to work in the context of GATT/WTO. Monetary com-
pensation.has been a topic of discussion in the context of GATT
for more that fifty years,72 though GATT contracting parties have
never taken it into consideration since monetary compensation
would have affected the nature of GATT as a diplomatic instru-
ment whose aim was to solve trade disputes under a consensual
basis. Although the WTO has moved away from being a diplo-
matic instrument to a more legal one,73 it is still a diplomatic
instrument where governments do not give up diplomacy to set-
tle disputes.74
IV. OUTLOOK
The benefit for businesses, both those supporting the com-
plaining Member and those supporting the Member subject to
the complaint, is that the dispute is being resolved by the world's
highest trade tribunal whose rulings, once adopted by the DSB,
are legally binding and cannot be contested. In fact, in the ma-
jority of WTO disputes in which a Panel has delivered a report,
the matter was appealed to the WTO Appellate Body (about
71. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sales and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, Decision. by the Arbitrators, WT/DS27 (Mar. 24, 2000); European Communities-
Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26-48.
72. In 1965 GATT developing countries proposed monetary compensation to be
paid to GATT parties injured by the GATT-illegal practice. GATT Doc. COM.TD/F/
W,1 and COM.TD/F/W.4.
73. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, How to Promote International Rule of Law? Contribu-
tions by the WTO Appellate Review System, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WITO (1998).
74. For an in-depth analysis of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the WTO, see
Thomas Cottier, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Characteristics and Struc-
tural Implications for the European Union, CMLR 35, 325-78, 1998; P. Pescatore, The New
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM AFTER THE
URUGUAY ROUND, EIP, Brussels, 661-85 (1997).
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thirty out of forty cases to date). Most Appellate Body reports
upheld all or some of the findings of the Panel. The Appellate
Body reports, therefore, enhance legal certainty, which is benefi-
cial for business.,
Business, therefore, should make use of the WTO dispute
system. At present, however, there are many obstacles that need
to be resolved. Some of the main issues have been highlighted
in this Essay.
A non-exhaustive check-list of issues that need to resolved
include the following:
* Businesses as such, being non-governmental entities, can-
not bring disputes or join as third-parties but must act in-
directly through their governments. Mechanisms exist in
some WTO members, such as the TBR, by which busi-
nesses can require their government to initiate a WTO
dispute settlement procedure.
• The duration of the procedure is too long when one con-
siders that businesses would first need to lobby their gov-
ernment to bring the case before the WTO (or submit a
TBR complaint in the EU). For businesses trading over-
seas it is important to have an idea as to the duration of
the process. It is hoped that as the volume of Panel and
Appellate Body reports increases, WTO Members would
be able to assess whether their legislation complies with
their international, obligations and ensure that disputes
do not arise or are settled at the consultation stage. Con-
ciliation, good-offices, and mediation should also be more
fully explored by WTO Members.
" The implementation period and the ability of WTO Mem-
bers to prolong the procedure is unhelpful for business.
It should be suggested, therefore, that compensation be
available at an earlier stage. This would provide both an
incentive and a benefit to the affected businesses.
" Retaliation does not assist businesses in gaining market
access.
The WTO Appellate Body, however, is progressively al-
lowing business a greater say in disputes. For example, the Ap-
pellate Body in the Shrimps case has ruled that NGOs could sub-
mit an amicus curiae brief stating their position on the dispute.
This has been extended in the Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Car-
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bon Steel Products case also to apply to trade associations. Now
that both NGOs and trade associations can inform the Panel of
their position, amicus curiae briefs could become a beneficial tool
for businesses.75 It is hoped that this will prepare the ground for
a more substantial role for business within the WTO in the years
to come.
It is noteworthy that these developments coincide with the
recent demands by the European Union and the United States
to have more transparency within the WTO after their trade poli-
cies had been strongly criticized at the Seattle Ministerial. Both
countries have submitted to the WTO General Council propos-
als dealing with transparency.76 Of particular interest is the pro-
posal of the United States in which the United States suggests
"officially" launching a mechanism for third party submissions,
other than governments, as well as public participation in Panel
and Appellate Body meetings on a first-come first-served basis.
The presence of the public in dispute settlement meetings will
better assist the affected business involved in the dispute. Public
participation also should be extended to the negotiation phase
of the dispute so that companies and trade associations can have
more accurate reports on the dispute.
In conclusion, the outlook for the WTO dispute settlement
system is positive if a balance is struck between the legal nature
of the system and the political nature of the organization within
which it is operating. By allowing businesses to participate in the
process, legal certainty will be promoted and political trade-offs
will be avoided.
75. For different views expressed by the business community as to the role of the
WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism in relation with private parties' interests, see the
Panel Discussion at the 6th Geneva Global Arbitration Forum in 1997, Is the WFO Dis-
pute Settlement Mechanism Responsive to the Needs of the Traders? Would a System of Direct
Action by Private Parties Yield Better Results, 32 J. WORLD TRADE, No.2, 147-65 (1997).
76. Improving the Function of the WTO System, Discussion Paper from the European
Community to the WTO General Council, WT/GC/W/412 (Oct. 6, 2000); General
Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency October 2000, Submission from the
United States-Revision, WT/GC/W/413 (Oct. 13, 2000).
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